Today many argue that there appears to be an epidemic case of "fear of floating".
Introduction
, hereinafter C&R, argue that the bipolar view that exchange rate regimes today tend to be either fixed or floating is not accurate. In particular, they show that many regimes that claim to float actually use the domestic interest rate to prevent large fluctuations in their currency's value. While not fixing their exchange rate in the traditional sense, neither are these countries allowing it truly to float.
C&R term such behavior fear of floating (FF).
The problem with C&R's framework is that it does not distinguish between a credible inflation targeting (IT) regime, a fixed exchange rate (FIX) regime, or FF. Their analysis is based on a model which argues that credible IT is identical to FF. In their words, "in this setting inflation targeting can explain fear of floating." (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002, p. 399) . Since the rate of inflation and the rate of currency depreciation are identical in their model, it follows that IT, which targets inflation, and FIX, which targets the depreciation rate, are identical. One thus arrives at the conclusion that credible IT, FF and FIX are three equivalent regimes 1 . Rather than clarifying matters, this complicates attempts to classify de facto exchange rate regimes based on their work since their argument is that these regimes are indistinguishable from one another.
Their theoretical equality of IT, FF and FIX seems to have led to some confusion in C&R's own work. They argue that credible IT is identical to credible FIX. They also list the countries they recognize as inflation targeters and the dates for which they inflation target (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002, fn. 15, p. 393) . But they then proceed to classify those same IT countries as "Floating" for comparison purposes in their analysis.
So in their work IT = FIX, on the one hand, and then IT = FLEX, on the other. The most startling example is Australia. On page 393 they list Australia as IT since January 1994.
In Table 1 (p. 385), however, they use Australia as one of the three benchmark floating regime countries from January 1984 -November 1999 which includes the years they claim Australia is IT. As it happens, all IT countries in their sample are treated as floaters. In this light, their result that many of the floaters look similar to managed exchange rate regimes isn't as surprising. If their theoretical model is right, then 1 In Appendix A we show this equality in their model. empirically they've constructed a sample that assumes their result to begin with. We do not in any way believe C&R intentionally organized their sample for this reason, but do feel that this is precisely the kind of problem that arises from not properly identifying IT as a regime distinct from floating and FF, or fixing.
This paper attempts to untangle the IT and FF regime classifications. To do this we argue that FF is a regime that claims to do one thing -namely inflation target or float -but actually does another by adding extra policy weight to an implicit exchange rate target. In doing so we aim also to address whether many IT countries today truly IT or actually FF in disguise.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 focuses on Calvo and Reinhart's (2002) work. Section 3 presents our analytical framework. Section 4 discusses our data.
Section 5 discusses our analysis and results. Section 6 concludes.
Fear of Floating and Inflation Targeting
At the heart of C&R's (2002) FF analysis is an appeal to the logic of the various de facto regimes. Fixers should display relatively constant exchange rates and lots of international reserve variation while floaters should display the opposite. Fear of floaters should then display less exchange rate variation than floaters, but more than fixers. Their international reserve variation should be less than fixers and more than floaters. That is, they should lie somewhere between the two extremes. The new twist C&R add is that the data on fear of floaters should also display a much higher variation in domestic interest rates due either to a lack of credibility and/or the policymaker's reaction function.
The C&R analysis uses these behavioral implications to generate statistical predictions to organize their data. They use these predictions to classify 39 countries into floaters at one extreme, fixers at the other and fear of floaters somewhere in between. To establish benchmark cases for their analysis they show that there is a 79 percent probability that domestic currency depreciation of recent floaters 2 is within a two-and-ahalf-percent band while the probability for managed (or, limited flexibility) regimes and pegs is 92 to 95 percent, respectively. Based solely on exchange rate fluctuations they find that, of the IT countries in their sample, Canada, Sweden and Chile do not appear to 2 Australia is included as a benchmark floater in their work, even for the years it is IT.
float while Mexico and Korea appear to float. When they look at the variation of international reserves, the list of countries that are IT but found to be non floaters is Canada, Sweden, Mexico and Korea. Finally, in analyzing changes in the nominal interest rate they find that the interest rate of "true" floaters is within their pre-defined bands about 83 percent of the time. By way of comparison, Canada's interest rate is within that same band 62 percent while the Korean and Mexican rates are only within the band 20 and 9.4 percent of the time, respectively.
The problem with their analysis is that their theoretical foundation predicts that credible IT is equivalent to FF and FIX (see our Appendix A). In organizing their data for empirical analysis, however, they include known IT regimes as floating regimes and even use an IT regime (Australia) as a benchmark floater. This unintentionally adds an element of confusion to their analysis that obscures rather than clarifies their regime classification results.
Ball and Reyes (2004) modify C&R's analysis and examine Mexican data more closely. They argue that at least some of Mexico's interest rate variability can be ascribed to IT behavior as distinct from FF. Focusing on the timing of interest rate variations, they find that "large changes in the domestic real interest rate are associated eighteen percent of the time with large changes in inflation, but only nine percent of the time with the nominal exchange rate" (Ball and Reyes, 2004) . That is, domestic real interest rate changes appear to be more often associated with fighting inflation than nominal exchange rate movements. This does not say that Mexico doesn't exhibit any FF, but merely that it doesn't appear to do so to the degree implied by the C&R analysis.
The current paper continues in that vein by modifying C&R's original analysis and by treating IT as a regime distinct from both floating and fixing in an attempt to empirically identifying it as such.
Modified Approach
"Many of the recent converts to floating exchange rates (several of whom were forcibly converted) have opted for inflation targeting, and that system seems to be working well and has much to commend it. With the inflation targeting approach to monetary policy, movements in the exchange rate will be taken into account indirectly in setting monetary policy, because the exchange rate affects price behavior. This will generally produce a pattern of monetary tightening when the exchange rate depreciates, a response similar, but not necessarily of the same magnitude, to that which would be undertaken if the exchange rate were being targeted directly." (Fischer, 2004, pp.328-241, italics added) We build on the logic presented in Fischer's quote and focus on the Taylor rule that results from a wide range of central bank optimization problems. The basic Taylor rule for a strict IT regime is * ( )
where r t is the real interest rate, r* is the world real interest rate, Π t is the overall inflation rate, Π T is the inflation target, b is a parameter, and by "strict" IT we mean that there is zero policy weight placed on the output gap. We are not interested in output fluctuations and thus simplify away from them here.
Equation (1) follows the literature on Taylor rules in that interest rates react to current inflation even though the target is not formulated in terms of current inflation.
Instead, the target is in terms of forecasted future inflation (usually two dates in the future). Current inflation is part of the rule because it, along with current output and exogenous shocks in most models, is a predictor of future inflation (Svensson 1997) . In our analysis we will exploit that interest rates and targeted variables vary contemporaneously.
The rule is in terms of the real, not the nominal, interest rate. This is appropriate for economies where the short-term nominal interest rate is the instrument. Additionally, we chose this form to better distinguish between interest rates and inflation. Vegh (2001) argues that real-interest rate rules are frequently observed in emerging markets and that under certain restrictions, like Cagan-form money demand specifications, they are equivalent to nominal interest rate rules. To address possible concerns, however, we include the results for nominal interest rates in all our reported results.
For us, the concern with equation (1) does not lie in the use of the real interest rate, but in that Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh (2004) find that developing-economy monetary policy is often procyclical (i.e., interest rates rise in bad times and fall in good times). This argues that the sign of the coefficient in a regressed version of (1) is negative, not positive as the theory here will suggest. We address this in Section 5 by regressing versions of equation (1) For an open economy, the interpretation of equation (1) 
Analytical Framework
We assume that countries have some goods that are not traded ("home" goods) and that the law of one price holds perfectly for all goods that are traded. The price level for this economy is thus a combination of home and traded good prices, P H and P T , respectively.
Allowing the law of one price to hold for traded goods and assuming zero foreign inflation, this economy's overall inflation rate is determined by
We will assume that α = 1 -α to avoid putting unwarranted weight on either price.
Further, let both home good inflation, Π H , and traded good depreciation, Ê , be subject to small random shocks such that
where φ is a zero mean and constant variance shocks. And,
where ε is a zero mean and constant variance shocks.
A Stylized Example
To see the empirical implications of this framework consider the following simple example. First, let the inflation target, Π T , be zero. Second, let world interest rates, r*, also be zero along with world inflation, Π*. It then follows from (1) that any change in inflation, ∆Π, will translate into a change in interest rates, ∆r, differing in magnitude by parameter b. Since b is assumed to be positive, interest rates and inflation will move together.
Let there be a common upper, x HI , and lower, x LO , bound on the shocks to home good inflation and exchange rate depreciation so that there is no analytical favor given to either shock ex ante. In particular let either shock take either its lower or upper bound value with equal probability.
and
To allow for regime differences, restate the Taylor rule in the following general
Letting the targets be zero and substituting equations (3), (4) and (5) into this yields
Regime differences are captured by the differences in the weights b and c. (Woodford, 2003) .
Strict Inflation Targeting (IT):
( ) ( ) [ ] 0 . . ) 1 ( * > + − + + + = b t s e b r r H ε α φ π α Strict Exchange Rate Targeting (FIX): ( ) 0 . . * > + + = c t s e c r r ε
Fear of Floating (FF):
Since there are only two shocks and they can only take on two values each, this framework is simple enough that we can use our example to consider the effects of all four cases for the shocks and the empirical implications for interest rate movements under each regime. This information is summarized in Table 1 . The single, double, and triple inequality signs are notation to indicate whether there is one, two or three factors pushing interest rates in a given direction and thus indicate the expected magnitude of the change. FF is the only regime that can obtain three inequalities, for example, because it weighs exchange rate movements twice (b and c are positive). Lastly, note that these are movements in ex post real interest rates because ex ante the expected value of the shocks are zero.
[Insert Table 1 here]
Strict Inflation Targeting (IT)
Giving all shocks equal weight implies that there is an equal probability of an upward (pr(∆r > 0) = ¼ ) and a downward (pr(∆r < 0) = ¼ ) movement in the interest rate in response to shocks while the probability of no movement is one half (pr(∆r = 0) = ½ ). This is the same as the probability of observing a movement in inflation. In other words, there is an equal chance of seeing no interest rate change and some interest rate change. The empirical implication is that, under IT, the probability that we observe the interest rate movements equals the probability of a movement in inflation and there is an equal probability that the interest moves and that it doesn't.
Strict Exchange Rate Targeting (FIX)
Giving all shocks equal weight implies that there is an equal probability of an upward (pr(∆r > 0) = ½ ) and a downward (pr(∆r < 0) = ½ ) movement in the interest rate in response to shocks while the probability of no movement is zero (pr(∆r ≠ 0) = 1).
The empirical implication is that, under exchange rate targeting, we should see lots of interest rate variability (in theory the pr(∆r ≠ 0) = 1 ). This is the case that C&R termed FF or credible IT and their observation was indeed that interest rate variability tends to be high in these countries.
Although this example is very simple, a general prediction already starts to emerge allowing one to begin distinguishing between a FIX (strict exchange rate targeting) and IT. The probability of observing a movement in an IT regime's interest rate should be less than the probability of observing a movement in the fixed exchange rate regime's interest rate.
Fear of Floating (FF)
Several things are worth noting here. First, the interest rate always moves. Based on this metric alone, pr(∆r ≠ 0) = 1, the regime is indistinguishable from the FIX regime.
Second, the clean link between just ∆Π and ∆r as in the IT case has been broken. In Cases 2 and 3 the change in overall inflation is zero, but interest rates still move. In other words, if a country is fear of floating, we should observe that, while inflation also varies, interest rate movements are more associated with movements in the exchange rate than with the overall inflation rate alone. Lastly, the swings in the interest rate are always at least as large as the largest movement under the other two regimes. This suggests that interest rate volatility should be high and large in magnitude in FF countries.
Generalizing these results leads to the priors in our modified analysis of exchange rate regimes. Ball and Reyes (2004) show that modifying C&R's original analysis to distinguish between FF and IT regimes adds information to our understanding of why and when interest rates vary so much in IT countries. Our approach follows their lead in forming priors that we use to distinguish between regimes. We will be looking at variable changes that exceed some predefined threshold and at the co-movement of these variables. One must however be very careful, as always, about the degree to which these co-movements can be interpreted as causality.
Modified Fear of Floating Analysis
If a country is IT, then we anticipate the following priors will be born out in the data. These come from the implications of the model presented in Section 3.3 of this paper as well as from C&R's original paper.
where ∆ is the change in a variable, %∆ is the percentage change, and x is the critical threshold. Inflation, π, is the %∆ in CPI. We use C&R's thresholds for all variables that they included (x = 2.5 % for E and R but 4% for i) and use x = 2.5% for all new variables (π and r ).
Expression (10) argues that we expect to see the exchange rate changing more under IT than FF. This is because FF, by definition, explicitly implies intervention to offset changes in E while IT implies less frequent intervention. Likewise, expression (11) argues that we expect to see the rate of inflation (or inflation gap) changing more under FF than IT. Again, IT requires intervention to keep inflation near its target which implies not allowing inflation to fluctuate much. FF does not. Expression (12) is because FF might use R to offset E fluctuations while IT in theory should not be using R to fight inflation. Expression (13) and (14) follow directly from our model. That is, interest rates should vary more under FF than IT in general; and, for IT, interest changes should be more closely related to inflation than to depreciation.
The Data
We have striven to include only those countries that both claim and actually seem to inflation target. While this might imply periodic exchange rate concerns, such concerns should not openly override the target itself. Instead, exchange rate related policy actions should only be means to IT ends.
To determine these countries, we first used C&R 's 2002 paper (p. 393 Table 2 summarizes the results of replicating C&R's basic analysis for the countries in our sample, organized according to regime. It presents evidence on the frequency of changes in the exchange rate, foreign exchange reserves, and nominal interest rates. Additionally it contains variations in inflation and ex post real interest rates following the analysis in section 3. The complete tables from which Table 2 was built are in Appendix C.
Analysis and Results
[Insert Table 2 here]
In terms of exchange rate variation (Column 2), the probability that monthly variation exceeds the threshold level is highest for the floating regimes. IT falls between floating and fixing. This is in line with our prior (10). It suggests that while IT is not a true floating exchange rate regime, neither is it a fixed exchange rate regime.
Numerically its probability value is nearly midway between those of FIX and flex. The ttest for the difference between the mean for IT and for flex is -2.48 with p-value 0.018 and for the difference between IT and fix, it is 3.63 with p-value 0.001. Thus the results for IT indicate that statistically it lies in between the flex and the FIX results.
In terms of reserve usage (Column 3), IT displays the lowest probability of exceeding the threshold, lower even than the floating regimes 5 . Prior (12) implies that FF countries, looking more like fixing countries, should have higher probability values than IT. By IT having the lowest probability of all regimes in Table 2 , prior (12) appears to hold.
While we do not focus on nominal interest rates to the extent C&R do, the results in Table 2 , Column 4 indicate that IT is the least likely regime to display large fluctuations in nominal interest rates. Although the magnitudes are higher, the same result carries over to real interest rate variability (Column 6). Statistically IT has the lowest probability of exceeding the threshold 6 . While this is in line with prior (13), the inflation numbers (Column 5) appear to be driving this result. Inflation variability is consistent with prior (11) but also suggests something more. If IT does anything, it should be targeting and thus controlling inflation. The major objective of IT is to keep actual inflation at or near its target, something very precisely defined by a point or range target. Thus it is no surprise that inflation variation appears lowest under IT as seen in Column 5. Since IT links inflation variation to interest rate variation by equation (1), it follows that in lowering inflation variability, the need to adjust interest rates is less too.
Thus, on the logic of credibly IT alone, one should observe less interest rate variability too.
[Insert Table 3 here]
5 The t-test supports this result as well. 6 The t-test statistic for the comparison between IT and flex is -2.61 with a probability of 0.014 and for the comparison between IT and FIX the results are a t-statistic of -2.92 and a probability value of 0.006
While our focus is not on reserves, for comparison purposes, Table 3 . What is surprising in Table 3 is that floating and fixing look so similar, especially against the Japanese benchmark. This suggests that we still don't understand reserve usage in practice across floating and FIX regimes, a result also consistent with C&R's findings.
Up to this point, we have essentially replicated C&R's analytical approach but with a different division of the data. Whereas they classify IT as floating for empirical exercises but as FIX for theory, we have considered IT a distinct regime throughout. Our modified analysis -and the basic arguments for IT -predicts an additional prior in the data, our prior (14). Table 4 summarizes the results for this prior.
[Insert Table 4 here] (omitted dummy variable) was chosen. This is specifically addressed in the discussion that follows and indicated in Table 5 .
[Insert Table 5 here]
The results in Table 5 show that there is a difference between IT and the other regimes considered. The real interest rate of nine countries clearly responds differently under IT to changes in inflation 8 . For these countries, the dummy variable for the IT regime is positive and statistically significant, while the dummy variables for the other regimes are not significant. The positive sign means that bigger changes in the inflation rate bring about bigger changes in the real interest rate, a completely intuitive result. For these nine countries, except Canada and Thailand, the base regime is the managed float.
Therefore, the behavior of the real interest rate under IT is clearly different from the one observed under the base regime. It is important to note that for these countries the behavior of the real interest rate is statistically the same for all the other regimes (managed float, FIX, flex and limited flexibility when these apply). Thailand never implemented a managed float regime and thus the FIX regime is used as the base regime.
For Canada we use the flex regime as a base because our data does not include the period in which this country implemented a FIX regime. Having taken into consideration the differences in specification, the results for these two countries (Thailand and Canada) show that the real interest rate displays very different behavior under IT. For Canada the policy variable responds differently under IT relative to the base flex regime. For
Thailand the real interest rate behavior is different under IT than under FIX or flex.
There are two cases in which the dummy variable for IT and FIX are both significant. These cases are Chile and Korea. The results of Table 5 show that the dummy variables for IT and FIX are statistically significant but of different sign. The dummy variable for IT is positive while that of the FIX regime is negative. Since the base regime for both of these countries is the managed float regime, the real interest rate changes (differences) are bigger under IT (in line with the findings discussed before) and smaller for FIX relative to those observed under a managed float. Again, this result is in line with intuition since the main policy tool under a traditional FIX is the management of international reserves, not the interest rate. This suggests that these are not "modern"
FF-style fixed regimes using interest rates as C&R suggest. Table 5 for "Brazil". Once again, it is possible to conclude that the behavior of the real interest rate under IT is clearly different from what is observed under any other regime, and specifically under the managed float regime 12 . While the result that some specific regimes are identified as FF is important, we are more interested in the result that IT generally appears to be distinguishable from FF, FIX, and flex. That IT is identifiably different comes across fairly strongly throughout all of our results.
Conclusion
Today many argue that there appears to be an epidemic case of "fear of floating"
where countries claim to float but instead use domestic interest rates to mitigate large swings in their currency's value. At the same time, the adoption of interest-rate-rule IT regimes around the world continues to spread. These two observations are not independent.
At first glance IT can look like fear of floating because traded good prices appear in overall inflation targets thus explaining some of the interest rate and exchange rate variation observed in the literature. But, IT and FF should not be the same because interest rate movements under IT should only occur when hitting the inflation target is threatened and not whenever the currency's depreciation rate changes. This insight and the contemporaneous relationship between the variables in a standard Taylor rule allow us to distinguish between IT and FF.
We analyze the behavior of exchange rates, reserves, interest rates and inflation across 88 exchange rate regimes for 20 countries to study the degree to which IT regimes are distinct from other regimes and how much this matters. We find that IT, as a regime, is empirically distinguishable from pegged, floating, managed floating, limited flexibility and FF regimes. Credible IT appears to be more similar to floating and managed floating than to fixing and FF. Being able to identify these regimes accurately allows one to distinguish between cases where countries claim to inflation target but actually fear of float.
In general we find that most countries that claim to inflation target do in fact inflation target. It is important for the credibility of these regimes that this be recognized.
We also find evidence that four of the IT regimes (Peru, Poland, and South Africa) do behave more like fear of floaters and thus might be claiming to be IT, but are FF in disguise. 
The single, double, and triple inequality signs are notation to indicate whether there is one, two or three factors pushing interest rates in a given direction and thus indicate the expected magnitude of the change Calvo and Reinhart (2002) develop the following model. The numbering of the equations corresponds exactly to equations (1) through (9) in their paper. The difference between these equations and theirs is that we use E to denoted the rate of chnge in the nominal exchange rate and they use ε. where s is the spot nominal exchange rate. They next assume that the country pursues an inflation targeting regime. Supposing that the inflation target is zero, the welfare function that the central bank maximizes is
The multiplier b then measures the degree of commitment to inflation targeting.
Differentiating (A.6) with respect to time and substituting into (A.1) yields, with rearranging,
Letting foreign inflation and interest rates be zero and substituting (A.8) into (A.7) yields 2 ) ( 2 .9) They differentiate this with respect to interest rates, taking expected interest rates as given, to solve for the optimal policy rule under inflation targeting.
Their results indicate that as ∞ → b (i.e., as we approach full commitment to IT ), the central bank's behavior converges to that of a fear of floater. In their words, following equation (16) in their paper which is the variance of currency depreciation rate that emerges from the central bank's optimization problem, "the greater the commitment to an inflation target, the smaller will be the variance of the change in the expected exchange rate. Hence, in this setting inflation targeting can explain fear of floating." (C&R 2002, p. 399) . This establishes that, in the full commitment case, IT = FF.
To see that IT = FF = Fix, one need only notice that differentiating (A.6) with respect to time, and holding foreign inflation at zero, yeilds
Thus, we can substitute (A.10) into (A.7) to obtain,
which is the objective function if the central bank were strictly fixing the exchange rate and the target was zero.
By (A.10), equations (A.11) and (A.7) are equivalent so the resulting optimal policy functions are equivalent. This completes the last equality in IT = FF = Fix. Greather than a +/-2.5 percent band:
Appendix C
Probability that monthly change is
Greater than +/-4 percent (400 basis points): Within a +/-2.5 percent band: Probability that monthly change is
Greater than +/-4 percent (400 basis points): Greather than a +/-2.5 percent band:
Within a +/-2.5 percent band: Greater than +/-4 percent (400 basis points): Greather than a +/-2.5 percent band:
Within a +/-2.5 percent band: Probability that monthly change is
Within a +/-2.5 percent band:
Note: This replicates Calvo and Reinhart's (2002) Probability that monthly change is Greater than +/-4 percent (400 basis points): Greather than a +/-2.5 percent band:
